What To Make Of Myanmar’s Mosaic Of Marginalisation, Rich Resources, Communities & Their Multiple Claims

A Background Paper

What To Make Of Myanmar’s Mosaic Of Marginalisation, Rich Resources, Communities & Their Multiple Claims

A deep understanding and recognition of the very many layers to the Myanmar conflict, including involvement of external regional powers in the civil war, is imperative for any conflict resolution framework

Shimreisa Chahongnao

The Arakan Army’s siege of the last military outpost in northern Rakhine State on December 13, 2024 marked a significant shift in Myanmar’s civil war, sparking what is believed to be one of the most violent and deadly confrontations since the military coup in 2021. For the first time, the junta has lost control over the entire 270 km (170 miles) border between Myanmar and Bangladesh.^[2]

The conflict has intensified calls for urgent international intervention, highlighting the rapid erosion of democracy, a worsening humanitarian crisis, and the collapse of the rule of law. Understanding claims and strategies of diverse political leaderships in navigating resistance and shaping governance, analysing their mobilisation efforts and the interplay of domestic and international factors can help explore the pathways adopted for conflict resolution and leadership approaches to restoration of order.

There’s need to step back and review why the coup happened in the first place and who are the actors involved. Are subnational ethnic data readily amenable with the divisions imminent in the conflict? What are the rallying points for the ethnic armed groups and how do their leaders stake claims and envision the means to achieve them? What are the mechanisms deployed by various interest groups? These are some disparate yet intricately related issues in Myanmar that cannot be overlooked for long-term conflict resolution.

Intensity and Multi-layered Conflict

The military, known as the junta/Tatmadaw, staged a coup against the National Unity Government (NUG) of the National League for Democracy (NLD) on February 1, 2021. NUG, which came to power in 2016, won a decisive victory in the 2020 elections. However, the junta alleged widespread election fraud and corruption, prompting a seizure of power.^[3]

This led to armed resistance from over 20 groups, including political parties, students, and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), some of which have been fighting for autonomy since independence (Image 2).

The conflict has resulted in over 50,000 deaths, including more than 8,000 civilians, and detention of 26,500 opponents of the junta.^[4] Additionally, while tens of thousands have fled to Thailand and India,^[5] the Spokesperson of the UN Secretary-General said,

Humanitarian needs have reached unprecedented levels in Myanmar, with nearly 20 million people — nearly a third of them children — needing some form of help in 2025.  This is an increase of 1.3 million people from this year.  And according to our figures, 3.5 million people are internally displaced across the country and more than 15 million people are facing acute food insecurity.^[6]

Despite these humanitarian challenges, resistance forces have gained significant territorial control, setting the stage for a complex interplay of internal opposition and external geopolitics. Interplay between external factors, such as financial flows and arms deals, and internal dynamics of instability, such as constitutional revolution, political movement, identity, culture and land, are shaping the conflict.

X Factors: Beijing & Moscow’s Involvement

Myanmar has rich oil and natural gas reserves and is the world’s fourth highest producer of rare earth minerals.^[7] It’s an emerging major trans-shipment hub in Southeast Asia attracting investments from regional and global powers. However, the ongoing conflict has impeded its stability and progress.

This is compounded by external factors such as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and Moscow’s ‘Asian pivot’ policy. The effects spiral out to neighbouring countries, including Indo-Myanmar relations.

CMEC is integral to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).^[8] Established in 2017, CMEC aims to connect Kunming in China with Kyaukphyu in Myanmar’s Rakhine State through roads, railways, and a deep-sea port. These regions, however, are under the control of ethnic groups opposed to the junta, adding to the challenges of project implementation.

In December 2023, the junta signed an addendum to the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) agreement and its deep-sea port, underscoring its strategic importance for China’s energy security (primarily Yunnan province) and broader regional interests.^[9] Moreover, completing the CMEC would provide China overland access to Bay of Bengal (Image 1), a vital alternative to the Malacca Strait.^[10]

Image 2: Kunming-Kyaukphyu CMEC route.^[11]

The junta is reviving the 6,000MW Myitsone dam in Kachin state in northernmost part of Myanmar that was ended in 2011 due to environmental issues. It is vital to electricity requirements for many projects in China. When foreign ministers of the two countries met in Nay Pyi Taw on August 14, 2024, they expressed their decades of friendship based on “pauk-phaw” (kinship in Burmese).^[12]

The Chinese foreign ministry further declared that through means such as CMEC, Beijing’s committed to extend a “high-standard socialist market economy” in Southeast Asia. Both sides exchanged views on the six-nation Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) – a multilateral format that comprises five riparian states of Lancang River (as it’s known in China) and Mekong River (as it’s called in Myanmar). Yet, Beijing’s relationship with EAOs — selling them arms — complicates its support for the junta. It’s how external economic interests intertwine with Myanmar’s internal resistance.

Further, Moscow’s involvement is increasing. Kremlin has deepened ties with the junta, recognising the February 2021 coup, while the junta endorsed Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.^[13] In February 2023, Myanmar and Russia marked their 75^th anniversary of diplomatic ties. While China remains its biggest investor, Russia has emerged as Myanmar’s largest arms supplier.

Junta leader General Min Aung Hlaing views Russian arms superior to Chinese counterparts and regards Beijing’s close relations to EAOs and People’s Defence Force (PDF, NUG’s armed wing) with suspicion. For Russia, Myanmar has become the second most important country after Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Russia’s relation with Myanmar serves as a springboard to further its ‘Asian pivot’ policy.

While overtaken by Russian arms, Chinese arms continue to find a base in Myanmar with the latest being six more FTC-2000G midrange fighter jets arriving in August 2024.^[14] These overlapping alliances indicate strategic engagement of external actors with Myanmar despite its internal instability, a situation that also affects India.

Regional Rift: Impact On India

India shares historical, transnational ethnic and cultural relations, as well as economic ties with Myanmar, reinforced by a 1,643km land border and shared interests in Bay of Bengal.^[15] Myanmar’s pivotal to India’s Act East policy, serving as a gateway to Southeast Asia.

But the civil war’s complicated border security and humanitarian crisis, particularly after the May 2023 Manipur conflict. Manipur shares a 398km land border with Chin State and Sagaing Region in Myanmar currently controlled by ethnic armed groups. The flare-up in Manipur underscored the importance of engaging with respective stakeholders.

India has invested in infrastructure and capacity-building projects in Myanmar^[16] that also address broader constitutional and federal concerns.^[17] Yet, as with other external actors, India’s involvement is limited by Myanmar’s internal instability and broader implications of the humanitarian crisis on regional stability.

Crippled Economy: Myanmar’s Living Off Aid

Economic ramifications of the coup extend beyond Myanmar’s borders. The country saw a 13% drop in exports and a 20% reduction in imports as of March 2024.^[18] The poverty rate has risen to 32%, exacerbated by forced military conscription, labour market disruptions,^[19] and inflation exceeding 20%.^[20] Fiscal mismanagement has deepened the crisis, with its Central Bank funding over 70% of Myanmar’s budget deficit.^[21] International humanitarian aid is insufficient to address the scale of the crisis. Myanmar continues to receive highest humanitarian aid from EU (€20mn yearly),^[22] US ($121mn for FY 2024),^[23] Japan ($109.5mn since 2021 coup and another $37mn announced on March 8, 2024),^[24] also from Sweden, Australia, Germany, Switzerland, and New Zealand.^[25]

Financial flow is controlled by Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM). Right after the 2021 coup, the junta removed the bank’s governor and deputy governor, sentencing them to 20 years prison, and replaced the civilian-appointed leadership alleging politically motivated corruption.^[26]

Its political economy unravelling not only hinders Myanmar’s recovery but also impacts regional stability. What is often overlooked is that the conflict has deep roots in history and the nation’s political development.

Splice & Dice: How They Stack Up

Myanmar officially recognises 135 ethnic groups aligned to eight “major national ethnic races”: Bamar, Shan, Mon, Kayin (Karen), Kayah (Karenni), Kachin, Rakhine (Arakan), and Chin.

Territorial organisation is based on ethnicity. Seven regions dominated by Bamar majority lie at the country’s centre and along Myanmar’s external borders are seven states dominated by non-Bamar ethnic nationalities. Along with the regions, the states, and a union territory, there are five self-administered zones and a division of different ethnic groups (Image 2).

Image 3: Administrative Divisions of Myanmar^[27]

None of the 21 administrative units is homogenous. Ethnic groups are spread across states and regions. Ethnic heterogeneity has a trickle-down effect as some ethnic groups aren’t part of the 135 count. Moreover, townships that serve as electoral units are themselves heterogenous in terms of ethnic divisions. Ethnic enumeration has become highly significant in the state’s structure as the seven states, zones and Wa Division are created based on broad ethnic categorisation, which in itself is problematic.^[28]

Control of the 21 administrative units is under State Administrative Council (SAC), headed by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who is president, executive head, and commander-in-chief of all state armed forces.

Per the 2008 Constitution, in a state of national emergency, the commander-in-chief holds absolute legislative, executive and judicial power. In Chapter XI of the 2008 constitution, the commander-in-chief or the president can declare a state of emergency if the executive deems it’s impossible to carry out executive functions in any part of the country in accordance with the constitution.^[29]

Per the 2008 constitution, the executive power of the union is distributed among the union, regions and states, and to some extent, among self-administered zones (Article 199(a),(b)). It however does not provide for the establishment of local self-government below the region and state level. The basic political units — districts and townships — are administrative levels managed by civil servants.^[30]

Myanmar is currently under a state of emergency. The president has delegated legislative power to its SAC under his chair, primarily the military is empowered to oversee all the affairs of law making.

Behind The Coup: Junta Anxiety

Since independence in 1948 till the 2021 one, Myanmar has seen four military coups. The Tatmadaw has dominated Myanmar’s politics for decades, maintaining power through various means including direct rule, control of political parties, and constitutional provisions.^[31]

The 2021 coup, driven by personal power struggles and military-backed party’s electoral defeat, led to violent suppression of protests and a significant decline in the country’s democratic status.^[32]

The Tatmadaw’s ideology is rooted in anti-communist propaganda, primarily since 1950s and promoting the “Burmese Way to Socialism”. It has maintained its dominance over Myanmar’s politics and the state apparatus since. Even with hints of political liberalisation, the Tatmadaw is unwilling to cede its national political influence or institutional autonomy.^[33]

Held under house arrest since February 2021’s coup, the military leadership convicted and jailed Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of NLD. The military justified its coup citing charges of alleged corruption and fraudulent election practices. The junta alleged the election was unfair with nearly 8.6 million irregularities in the voter list in 314 townships; that the Election Commission turned a blind eye to their grievances.^[34]

But there are several speculative theories on motives for the coup. First, military leaders were deeply concerned about Aung San Suu Kyi’s growing popularity within the Bamar community, which had traditionally been a strong support base for the military. Second, military leadership feared NLD’s proposed constitutional reforms in March 2020, which threatened to significantly reduce their institutional autonomy.

A critical proposed amendment would have decreased the number of military members in parliament, diminishing their direct role in governance. Additionally, several high-ranking generals feared legal consequences that might face prosecution for past actions.

Old Tensions Flare-Up: Land Claims, Polarisation, Exclusion

Assigning any one or two reasons for the conflict is incomplete — seeing it as political fallout of countering democracy and a resistance against state oppression is oversimplifying the situation.^[35] Rather, political polarisation is perpetuated through deeply entrenched ethnic cleavages and regimes insensitive to multiple layers of social fabric, often loaded with divergent political practices.

There’s an ethnic attrition in Myanmar that’s coterminous with mobilisation, its violent conflicts rooted in long-standing historical grievances, ethnic tensions, and mutual existential fears among multiple actors. For instance, Rohingya people’s sub-minority issue in Rakhine State or propagating Buddhism as the state religion in other states.^[36]

Violence is deeply embedded in social structures and relationships, manifesting in various forms beyond just physical harm.^[37] It is often associated with power dynamics (including legislative power), resource competition, and cultural factors (such as land tenure).^[38] A raft of laws (constitutional) accelerated land polarisation tantamount to legal land grabbing, denying customary land ownership and favouring ‘modern’ farmers and business actors – upshot has been an unending civil war in upland Myanmar.^[39]

Ethnic minority communities comprise 30-40% of total population while ethnic states occupy nearly 60% of upland (forest) area and are home to marginalised, vulnerable and often persecuted ethnic nationalities.^[40] Just 20% of this upland area is used for agriculture employing 70% of the population and contributing 40% of GDP.^[41]

An estimated 10% of Myanmar’s population are minorities legally excluded from citizenship by birth. This includes Tamils, Gurkhas, Chinese, Bengalis, Punjabis, Rohingya, Telugus, Anglo-Burmese, Bayingyi, and some others.^[42] Their citizenship applications are scrutinised, even considered, but these minority populations aren’t granted minority status as they’re excluded from the official list of 135 national ‘races’.^[43] These minorities also have distinct cultural approaches to land use practice over several decades.

Historical Wounds: Landgrabs & Population Counts

The 1894 Land Acquisition Act under British colonial rule, the 1991 Wastelands Instructions during the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) era, and the 2012 Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Law under the previous Thein Sein Government all mentioned the ‘wasteland, vacant, fallow or virgin land’ to be made available for large-scale farming (open market). They all discount the fact that these upland areas are actively populated by different ethnic groups.^[44]

In 2015, it was found 57% of state-confiscated lands were customary land owned by smallholder farmers and only 47.5% had legal documents when their land was appropriated by Myanmar government.^[45] Colonial policy to privatise land use, the 1991 Central Committee on land giving military discretionary powers to commoditise land for investments, and the 2008 constitution that legitimised landgrab shaped the nature of land expropriation, oblivious to tenure rights.^[46] The 2016 Myanmar Land Law gave new impetus to protect small landholders in terms of restitution, but it is silent on redistribution on claims from internally displaced peoples.^[47]

The 2019 Land Acquisition, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (LARR) Law further legitimised land expropriation by effectively reducing compensation for seizing of land to only market value without accounting for farmers using land in accordance with traditional customary tenure.^[48]

The LARR Law 2019 is not subject to judicial review and cannot be challenged in a court of law. Thus, the 2016 Myanmar Investment Law promoting FDI and the LARR Law effectively legitimise land-grabs. This significantly increases social conflict and inequality.^[49]

Along with the role of external factors with vested interests in resources including land, post-independence attempts to establish Buddhism as state religion, and military regimes’ xenophobic tendencies collectively strained relations between the ethnic majority and minorities.^[50] State’s failure to incorporate minority voices in decision-making led to prolonged ethnic insurgencies and armed opposition in borderlands.^[51]

Though majority and minority ethnic relations are pivotal in unpacking the conflict’s complexities, recording and documenting of Myanmar’s ethnic diversity itself has been shrouded with concealed political undertones that circumvent objective quantification. A recent report from International IDEA highlights that,

“…statistics in Myanmar have long been omitted – at least in part because of political sensitivities and contradictory visions, not to mention that a more complete picture of Myanmar’s ethnic make-up could challenge that dominance of certain narratives and interests of certain groups – and thus remained largely speculative”.^[52]

However dubious, the most recent and only data on ethnic diversity is the General Administration Department’s (GAD) statistical report of 2020 before the coup. Its colonial imprints are writ large because the present-day administrative borders share close relation to district borders of British Burma.^[53] That said, the GAD report and District Gazetteers of British Burma are the two primary sources for statistical information on subnational ethnic diversity in Myanmar.

Factions & Friction: How Armed Groups Operate

In the resistance’s consolidation against the junta, the smaller ethnic armed groups took assistance from established ethnic armed groups such as the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). These three also constitute the Three Brotherhood Alliance that continues to conduct Operation 1024 in Shan State against the junta. It has sparked rebel offensives in several other states.

Post coup, NUG-in-exile’s armed wing PDF declared support to the ethnic groups’ military offensive against the junta. Operation 1024 has been described as a watershed moment because of its lethal blitzkrieg offensive.^[54]

Other ethnic armed groups such as Kachin Independence Army, Mon National Liberation Army, Kachin Defense Army, Chin National Army, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), are among several others active in Myanmar.

Now, within these groups are ethnic factions aligned to the Tatmadaw. For instance, when KNLA took over Myawaddy township, Kayin National Army (KNA’s a faction of KNLA aligned with junta since 1995) intervened, preventing a complete takeover of the township.

The junta HQ was allegedly able to bring KNA around with threats of air raids on their lucrative criminal enclaves, including casinos, unless it could push back KNLA.^[55]

Sitrep Stakeholders

Here’s a lowdown on current status of international agencies and stakeholders in the conflict.

Parties, groups, civil society | Political parties and student groups primarily seek to challenge the military’s extensive and absolute power. Ethnic groups, meanwhile, are primarily concerned with the state’s monopolistic control over resources and land, with many advocating for greater ethnic autonomy and self-governance. Within these ethnic communities, different factions envision achieving their goals through varying political strategies. While ethnic groups seek more inclusive development projects, they’re equally vocal about ecological concerns over projects such as the Myitsone dam project at the confluence of the Mayhka and Malikha rivers in Kachin state, a region known for its rich biodiversity.

Junta’s step back | The junta labelled the resistance groups as terrorists. From an initial scorched-earth policy approach the junta now insists on laying down arms and joining party politics.^[56]

Peace broker ASEAN | The troika model under the five point consensus – the current, previous and incoming ASEAN chair are to continue informal consultation on resolving the crisis in Myanmar.^[57] EU pointed out that the ASEAN’s revolving chairship is an impediment to a mediating role where sustained and continuous follow-up is a prerequisite for successful mediation. EU said a permanent chair overseeing conflict resolution for ASEAN to be effective as a peace broker.

Democracy keeper UN | UN holds an end to military’s campaign of violence and political repression is a prerequisite to conflict resolution in Myanmar^[58], advocating government permit people to exercise their human rights freely and peacefully.

China plays all sides | Beijing has engaged with all parties in Myanmar’s civil war. It’s close to both the ethnic armed groups and the government. It has been suggested that Beijing’s state-centric diplomacy^[59] galvanised in kinship symbolism^[60] is an attempt to protect to the maximum its own interests. China abstained from voting in UNGA resolution to condemn the military coup.

Moscow eyes ally | In recognising Tatmadaw as legitimate and strengthening its military government, Russia’s approach seems to lie in empowering state capacity to contain resistance. Russia has not only sold weapons to the junta but has educated Myanmar officers.^[61] Moreover, Buddhism as a traditional religion in Russia has fostered closer ties with those in power in Myanmar. Russia prepares to develop Myanmar as a full-fledged strategic ally and springboard to expand its influence in Southeast Asia. The Russian ‘Asia pivot’ policy adopted in 2001 have seen steady momentum. Russia is supporting the ASEAN role to facilitate talks between opposing parties in the Myanmar conflict.

India’s stake | Along the India-Myanmar border reside ethnic groups that straddle the intersection of both countries. In a flexible approach to conflict resolution, New Delhi for the first time had invited leaders and non-state actors from three Myanmar states: Chin, Rakhine and Kachin that border India to a seminar on ‘Constitutionalism and Federalism’ mid-November, hosted by the state-funded Indian Council of World Affairs. The non-state groups noted India’s initiative as a positive approach.^[62]

While India is cautious to comment on the junta given the latter’s proximity to China, GOI seems to be in close step with all concerned parties. At the same time India is taking stock of the security and stability concerns at its borders. New Delhi’s projects are vital to cooperation with Southeast Asian countries.

In gist, Myanmar’s conflict is deeply rooted in its ethnic diversity, historical grievances, and question of rule of law, entangled by geopolitical and economic interests. Its colonial legacy and struggles of post-independence governance have perpetuated ethnic marginalisation. Upshot is numerous minority groups are advocating for autonomy and resource control. This is compounded by constitutional reform movement that seeks to address centralisation of power.

External forces, driven by economic ventures like CMEC and strategic arms deals, added layers of complexity to the conflict. Political leaders navigating this intricate landscape stake their claims through alliances and resistance strategies that reflect both local grievances and broader geopolitical interests. For a lasting stability and reconciliation in Myanmar, an inclusive approach that integrates ethnic aspirations, reforms the constitutional framework, and mitigates external influences is an essential.

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